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The notion of the existence of two opposed cultures, one literary and one scientific, has a long 
pedigree going back to nineteenth century. However, it was C.P. Snow’s formulation of the idea in 
1959 and F.R. Leavis’s 1962 critique, which brought it to the fore in cultural discourse, where it has 
more or less remained ever since. The papers in this special double issue of Interdisciplinary Science 
Review examine the debate and its legacies from a variety of perspectives, while this introduction 
seeks to contextualise the issues raised and draw some contemporary lessons. 
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At the end of February 2016 The Observer published an article by the newish President of the Royal 
Society of London, Deputy Director of the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge and Nobel 
Prize winner, Sir Venki Ramakrishnan. Entitled ‘Today, scientific awareness has never been more 
essential’, he began by recounting what happens to him at parties when telling people that he is a 
scientist. He quickly sees ‘the first sign of panic and disengagement’ and changing the topic of 
conversation to literature or music. Put differently he was complaining that the latter are seen as a 
part of general culture while science, in his view, is not.1 While that might be his experience of 
parties in Cambridge, it is certainly not universal, and a scientist should certainly know better than to 
draw general conclusions from the observations of a single individual. I found this article irritating 
due, in part, to a déjà vu feeling of somehow having slipped back to 1980, but mainly because that 
weekend I happened to be staying in a 14th-century country house where one of the principle topics 
of conversation was engineering and its history.  
 Ramakrishnan repeated his party story a week or so later in his Radio 4 ‘Life Scientific’ 
interview with Jim Al-Khalili, so one is forced to accept that he really believes it. But perhaps, on 
reflection, it should not be found too surprising that the head of one of the world’s oldest learned 
societies should express such dated views. Ramakrishnan was nominated for the Presidency in 
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March 2015 (six months later than would have been expected from the practice in recent election 
cycles). The previous month the physicist Brian Cox had been appointed the Society’s first Professor 
for Public Engagement in Science, an appointment which guaranteed that the Society would resume 
its top down or deficit model of public engagement, asserting science was a special form of 
knowledge both in its content and methods of acquisition, though quite how the latter differs 
substantially from history, say, is not specified. The Royal Society of London’s previous efforts in 
public engagement, mostly through the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science (COPUS 
discussed by Lock) came to a shuddering halt at the end of the 1990s in the wake of the public 
perceptions of the problems surrounding bovine spongiform encephalopathy, genetically modified 
organisms, global climate change and the measles, mumps and rubella vaccination.  In February 
2000 the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology referred to a public crisis of 
confidence and trust in science.2 Given the significant resources allocated to COPUS during the 
previous fifteen years the intellectual bankruptcy of the top down model was well evinced. Changing 
the word ‘understanding’ to ‘engagement’ without the Society making a fundamental ideological 
change in direction and attitude towards the public (neither of which are in evidence) simply does 
not solve the problem, which we know from the COPUS fiasco, cannot be achieved by a top down 
approach.3 Cox was made aware of what had happened in the 1980s and 1990s so quite how his 
views mesh with his assertion that ‘above all we must promote reason above opinion’ is not 
immediately apparent.4 Overall both stories provide evidence that the scientific community suffers 
from a collective historical amnesia about past efforts to link science, society and culture. It is not 
clear, whether this condition is intentional or just due to lack of knowledge or interest. 
 Although they may not be fully conscious of it both Ramakrishnan’s party experiences and 
Cox’s top down promotion of science are both framed in a supposed gulf between scientists and 
literary intellectuals that was termed the ‘Two Cultures’ by C.P. Snow, former chemist turned 
bureaucrat, novelist and pundit. The term may have been invented by Snow and the X-ray 
crystallographer and Nobel Prize winner Lawrence Bragg in the course of a train journey between 
Cambridge and London (Cole), but it was first used by Snow in a New Statesmen article published at 
the time of the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956.5 Three years later he used it as the title for his 
1959 Rede lecture to the University of Cambridge, which following an attack, nearly three years 
later, by the Cambridge literary critic Frank Leavis, the virulence of whose language still shocks to 
this day,6  provoked one of the major post-1945 cultural rows in Britain, excellently recounted by 
Ortolano (2009). It would seem that Leavis’s intervention gave traction to Snow, his lecture and the 
term. Those who attended the lecture don’t seem to have been overly impressed at the time and 
certainly did not anticipate the significance it would come to have. Martin Rudwick recounts his 
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puzzlement as to why he as a practicing geologist should know about thermodynamics to be counted 
as scientifically literate (Rudwick), while the geneticist Walter Bodmer didn’t believe in the existence 
of the cultural divide Snow proposed and thought the call for more technologists was known by 
everyone but that Snow did make ‘the obvious a little interesting!’.7 
 At one level it might seem extraordinary that a debate initiated nearly sixty years ago can 
still provoke strong views, as some of the papers published here indicate. But such longevity 
suggests the existence of underlying issues, which have not gone away. These include the anxiety of 
scientists about the place of science in culture and society (evinced by Ramakrishnan’s Observer 
piece) and Britain’s place in the world. It was scarcely a coincidence that Snow’s first outing of the 
idea was during the lead up to the Suez crisis. This Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt 
demonstrably and unambiguously showed that British power had declined irreversibly and this 
probably explains the narrowly parochial outlook of the later lecture. The agonised debates 
unleashed after Suez about what Britain’s post-imperial role in the world should be have never been 
resolved and show little prospect of being so (I am writing this in the midst of the EU referendum 
campaign). Both these underlying issues suggest a strong sense of insecurity and anxiety throughout 
large sections of British culture and society. Given all that, we should perhaps be less surprised that 
the issues surrounding the two cultures still retain significance and substance as all the papers in 
their different ways illustrate. 
 In many ways, Snow was actually an ideal person to give early expression to Britain’s sense 
of insecurity and anxiety. Coming from a lower middle class family in Leicester, a provincial town in 
the English midlands, Snow displayed the abiding insecurity of members of that class who had 
moved socially upwards. Via Alderman Newton’s School and University College, Leicester, he made 
his way in 1928 to Cambridge University where he became a tutor at Christ’s College and a not 
especially good physical chemist – hence his interest in thermodynamics. He attracted the attention 
of Bragg following the latter’s appointment as Director of the Cavendish Laboratory in 1938. 
Thereafter, despite having no formal connection, Snow attached himself to the Cavendish and wrote 
glowingly of it and the physics research undertaken there. For Snow, despite his own experiences as 
a researcher, Cavendish physics became the epitome of what science should be – a view that 
pervades both his Two Cultures lecture and his Strangers and Brothers novel series. In this sequence 
of eleven novels, published between 1940 and 1970, Snow makes his alter ego, Lewis Eliot, a lawyer 
rather than a scientist which might have been expected given Snow’s cultural position. The inference 
one might draw is that in the late 1930s Snow believed (wrongly as it turned out) that, as a scientist, 
he would not be able to expect the career trajectory he had in mind for Eliot. Much more realistic, 
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therefore, to make Eliot a lawyer, a traditional route into the higher echelons of the civil service and 
politics. That Snow’s view of science and its career opportunities became somewhat at odds with his 
experience in that he sought to make his own story better than it was, does suggest a degree of 
personal insecurity. 
 There is a tendency by non-historians to view issues and ideas, such as the Two Cultures, as 
timeless (which some recent work in intellectual history unfortunately supports). Ortolano’s meta-
theme of his paper opposes this trend by showing that Snow’s role in the Two Cultures can only be 
fully understood in terms of the changing meaning of liberalism in twentieth-century Britain. By the 
1970s liberalism had so transformed itself that Snow came to appreciate that he was out of political 
sympathy with the social changes that had been wrought. It is doubtful, however, that had he lived a 
year or two longer, Snow would have left the Labour Party to join the breakaway Social Democrat 
Party; he profoundly disagreed with Shirley Williams who as Secretary of State for Education and 
Science had implemented comprehensive secondary schooling to which Snow was firmly opposed – 
he got into serious political trouble for sending his son to Eton.  
All this was tied up, as Ortolano discusses, with Snow, a committed technocrat, developing a 
serious dislike of modernist authors such as James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, members of the 
Bloomsbury group such as Virginia Wolf, and others, all of whom he regarded as opposed to material 
progress which could only be delivered through having more scientists and technologists. He 
emphasised this point in Strangers and Brothers when characterising Austin Davidson, the high 
Bloomsbury future father-in-law of Lewis Eliot. Snow, using Eliot’s first person voice, satirised 
Davidson for his difficulties about using a telephone: ‘Davidson, who was so often the spokesman of 
the modern, whose walls were hung with the newest art, had never come to terms with mechanical 
civilization’ (Snow 1956, ch.37). Snow’s intellectual descendants, such as the science journalists Colin 
Tudge and Michael Kenward, have maintained this hostility to literary intellectuals referring to 
publications of Vita Sackville West’s posthumous letters or Lawrence’s annotated laundry lists (Lock) 
(despite the former being an impossibility and I, at least, have never seen the latter).  
 Snow and Leavis appear to have shared one assumption, namely the belief that literature 
and culture were the same thing. Snow hardly ever expresses any interest in the visual arts, music or 
architecture; presumably he approved the modernist architecture of Churchill College, Cambridge, 
which Ortolano points out was the material instantiation of Snow’s ideological outlook. Snow’s 
antipathy towards literary modernism and his indifference to other arts goes a long way to explain 
why did not understand that his (self-defined) cultures were far from divided both in the past and 
during his lifetime. Two of the papers here (Field and Ambrosio) deal specifically with the visual arts, 
5 
 
but identical points could as easily be made for literature.8 Field points out that terms such as art, 
science, architecture etc, had rather different meanings in the Renaissance than those that apply 
today. These differences mean that those figures, such as Piero della Francesco or Leonardo da Vinci, 
who look from today’s perspective as if they were working across Snow’s cultures, were doing no 
such thing, but operating within the conventions of their own day. Even though it may make it more 
difficult to understand how past events have affected us, it is always misleading, sometimes 
dangerously so, to read the past in terms of today’s categories, as Snow conspicuously did in his 
lecture. On a proper historicist reading at least we would not have the nonsense that Leonardo 
invented the helicopter! 
 In the twentieth century, as Ambrosio shows, science and mathematics played a key role in 
modernist art, especially cubism – its very name after all invokes mathematical concepts. In 
particular Ambrosio discusses the influence on art of non-Euclidean geometry, the fourth dimension 
and X-rays. All this gives the lie to Snow’s argument about intellectuals (literary or otherwise) not 
knowing anything about science; rather one could say that Snow knew very little about the 
modernists and science – cultural divides cut both ways after all.  
 So, aside from illustrating collective historical amnesia and contemporary ignorance, where 
did Snow’s ideas come from? Very near the start of the lecture he commented: 
Anyone with similar experience would have seen much the same things and I think 
made very much the same comments about them. It just happened to be an unusual 
experience. By training I was a scientist: by vocation I was a writer. That was all 
(Snow 1959, 1). 
This overlooked his war work, something which until now has been rather opaque. Cole in his essay 
traces Snow’s involvement, under Bragg’s patronage, with the Central Register of scientists that 
started to be prepared in the summer of 1938 to meet the scientific needs for the coming war. Again 
Snow’s own account of his role differs significantly from the actuality. Nevertheless, Snow’s 
involvement with the Central Register was a crucial turning point in his career both from a practical 
and ideological viewpoint. He became part of a developing powerful coterie of civil servants, 
politicians and scientists which led to his appointment as a Civil Service Commissioner in 1945 and 
ultimately elevation to the House of Lords as junior Minister of Technology under Frank Cousins in 
Harold Wilson’s first government of the mid-1960s (Ortolano and Ortolano 2009, 173-82). And his 
experience during the war also led him to the view that there was a need, both in war- and peace-
time, to educate a larger number of people for the technical and specialist roles that modern 
industrial society required. Indeed in the wake of the debate he told Bragg that he thought his 
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lecture provided ‘modest and practical educational proposals’.9 It was in the third section of his 
lecture that Snow made these proposals which were: 1. Train as many ‘alpha plus scientists’ as 
possible; 2. Educate a far larger number of ‘alpha professionals’; 3. Produce an even larger number 
of technicians qualified to the standard of part I of the Cambridge Natural or Mechanical Sciences 
Tripos; and 4. Ensure that politicians and administrators ‘know enough science to have a sense of 
what the scientists are talking about’ (Snow 1959, 35-6). One does wonder how much he was 
influenced by Aldous Huxley’s dystopian warning Brave New World (1932). 
 Of course technology (and engineering) had to be practically conducted by industry and 
Snow had difficulties with how scientists might be involved. For instance on 3 April 1944, he and 
Bragg had a meeting with the director of the GEC laboratories at Wembley, Clifford Paterson, to 
discuss his scientific manpower requirements. Snow told an incredulous Paterson that ‘industry is 
such a place that no scientist wishes to go there unless compelled!’; Paterson was relieved to return 
to his ‘cheery and buoyant colleagues and the inspiring atmosphere at Wembley’ (Clayton and Algar 
1991, 466). Quite how one should read this episode is not clear, especially as few months earlier 
Bragg and Snow had begun planning for the scientific manpower needs of industry after the war 
(Cole). Perhaps instead of scientists Snow meant alpha plus physicists, who, as his scientific ideal, 
should not sully themselves with such mundane matters as industry. Or perhaps he was failing to 
declare an interest, since from 1944 Snow also worked part-time for GEC’s competitor, English 
Electric. Whatever the explanation, by 1959 Snow had come to see that in a technocratic society 
‘Industrialisation is the only hope of the poor’ (Snow 1959, 24) and thus one of the reasons for 
training more scientists and technologists was to continue industrial expansion.  
Snow, as a technocrat, took the view that world poverty would only be eliminated if ‘trained 
scientists and engineers [were] adaptable enough to devote themselves to a foreign country’s 
industrialisation for at least ten years out of their lives’ (44-5). In other words Snow aimed to create 
a world entirely in the image of the technocratic Britain that he wanted to see. Of course the reality 
when different cultures meet is much more complex as Miller neatly illustrates in his study of the 
recent attempts to locate a major western scientific facility, the Thirty Meter Telescope, on Mauna 
Kea in Hawai’i. The ensuing and continuing controversy surrounding this project illustrates that the 
imposition of western ways of doing things no longer works, even in areas which have been subject 
to western political domination for significant periods. Perhaps, in view of the context provided by 
the Suez crisis, the spreading of western science and technology throughout the world was Snow’s 
way of continuing British imperial power. 
 One problem with all of this, as Gosling, a physics graduate turned engineer, trenchantly 
argues in his paper, was that Snow misunderstood completely the relations between science, 
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engineering and technology, which immediately raises issues about their role in industry. Gosling is 
particularly offended by Snow’s later suggestion that particle physics and aircraft design are much 
the same sort of activity. As a result Gosling believes that the two cultures episode resulted in some 
people becoming mediocre scientists rather than staying with technology. If this was so, then it 
illustrates that the row had profound significance to many individuals beyond those immediately 
concerned.  
 It must be a moot point whether Snow, a year and a half into the battle with Leavis, really 
believed that his lecture made modest proposals, if such they were, since it was his tests for 
scientific and literary literacy that provoked reaction: 
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, by the 
standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly educated and who have with 
considerable gusto been expressing their incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists. 
Once or twice I have been provoked and have asked the company how many of 
them could describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it 
was also negative. Yet I was asking the scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work 
of Shakespeare’s? (Snow 1959, 14 original emphasis and capitalisation retained) 
On the following page he wondered whether the discovery of parity violation (‘an experiment of the 
greatest beauty and originality’) made a couple of years earlier by the particle physicists C.N. Yang 
and T.D. Lee had been discussed ‘at every High Table in Cambridge’. Once again Snow’s 
concentration on physics and the mores of Cambridge socialising formed the basis for his general 
concerns. 
 Consequences of the row included numerous attempts to ‘bridge’ the divide between the 
cultures. Haste looks at one such attempt to create a third culture and in the process reminds us that 
the issues at stake were not restricted to the parties of the chattering classes but had profound 
political and epistemological implications. In terms of politics Ortolano, Lock and Haste all point out 
the significance of Snow, through his network, in forming Labour Party policy and not just in science. 
Harold Wilson’s speech to the 1963 party conference in Scarborough (his first as leader) is shot 
through with Snowian technocracy and attitudes to industrial management. The new socialist Britain 
would ‘be forged in the white heat of this [scientific] revolution’ (Pimlott 1992, 304). The scientific 
revolution to which Wilson referred was not that of the seventeenth century popularised by Snow’s 
former protégé the historian of science Rupert Hall (1954). In this case the term, appropriated by 
Snow for the subtitle of his lecture and copied by Wilson, referred to the twentieth century 
(Rudwick). Snow became Minister of Technology the following year.  
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In terms of epistemology, Haste examines the work over the past decade or so of, among 
others, John Brockman, JohnJoe McFadden and Al-Khalili which argues that much of what we know 
from scientific research informs how we view our place in the world. The latter two scientists in their 
work on quantum biology point out that though what happens at the quantum level affects the 
macro level this may not happen in ways that might be expected, or indeed predictably, from 
conventional scientific knowledge. Such science, which has a strong popular following, will, if borne 
out, necessarily impact on how we understand the world and our place in it and suggests a possible 
return to natural philosophy, a term that fell out of fashion early in the twentieth century. Such 
approaches thus have the potential to combine aspects of the scientific and literary cultures, put in 
opposition by Snow, into a third culture. 
 Another approach which addressed the issues raised by the whole affair was the history of 
science and technology. The close link between the subject and the two cultures can be seen in the 
appointment of the Professor of the History of Science and Technology advertised by Imperial 
College in 1962: ‘the first holder of the chair will have the opportunity to bridge one of the gaps 
between the humanities and the sciences’.10 The appointee, Hall, who despite his strong connection with 
Snow, was doubtful about the role assigned to history of science. He commented in his inaugural lecture 
that he preferred leaving bridge building to engineers.11 Nevertheless, it is striking that in the next few 
years in addition to history of science groups already in existence at University College London and 
Cambridge University, new ones were also established at, among other institutions, the universities of 
Manchester, Leeds, Kent, Lancaster, Durham, Leicester, Bath, Aberdeen and Queen’s Belfast. 
Although empirical research has yet to be undertaken on how and why most of these history of 
science groups came into existence, the timing does strongly suggest a close link, at least in some 
cases, with the two cultures debate. Once again its impact was substantive, not just rhetorical as the 
autobiographical accounts by Rudwick and Knight well illustrate. They both crossed from scientific 
training and practice to the history of science, but brought the knowledge and skills they had 
acquired to their history of science practice. In Rudwick’s case this involved pioneering methods of 
visualisation in the history of science and showing the value of fieldwork in understanding and 
reconstructing the work of past geologists. 
Despite much valuable teaching and research activity, history of science, unsurprisingly, 
failed to meet the cultural expectations placed on it and following the election of Margaret Thatcher 
as Prime Minister in 1979, the relationship of society, culture and science came to the fore, at least 
as far as the scientific community was concerned (Lock). Contrary to what Snow believed would 
happen when politicians were scientifically educated, the government led by Thatcher, who had 
read chemistry in Oxford in the 1940s, imposed drastic cuts on university and science budgets. 
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Besides the policies of the new government, other issues were also in play such as the retirement or 
death of scientists who had come to prominence as young men (and they were entirely male) in the 
war of 1939-1945 and who had then enjoyed long and powerful careers at the top of the scientific 
establishment and civil service. If they were replaced, it was not at the same level. The Royal Society 
of London responded to these challenges by establishing in April 1983 a committee chaired by 
Bodmer to enquire into the ‘Public Understanding of Science’. The whole thrust of the Bodmer 
report showed, once again, the collective historical amnesia of significant sections of the scientific 
community. While the report contained fleeting references to scientists in the past who had 
popularised science, the report contained lines such as ‘Scientists must learn to communicate with 
the public, be willing to do so, and indeed consider it their duty to do so’ (Royal Society [of London] 
1985, 6) as if this was an entirely novel insight. One consequence of such continuing amnesia is that 
nothing can be learned from the past, although this of course has the immediate effect of making 
the new practitioners look original, at least in their own eyes.  
One outcome of the Bodmer report was the establishment of COPUS a joint committee of 
the Society, the Royal Institution and the British Association. Chaired initially by George Porter (for a 
while simultaneously Director of the Royal Institution and President of the other two organisations), 
he was followed by Bodmer, the developmental biologist Lewis Wolpert, and, finally, before its end, 
the former Director of the Wellcome Trust, Bridget Ogilvie. COPUS arranged a well-funded 
programme of varied activities (Lock, Haste) which led to renewed general discussion about the 
place of science in relation to society and culture and thus to a disinterment of the Two Cultures 
rhetoric and controversy, for example in the 1991 spat between Wolpert and the novelist Fay 
Weldon discussed by Lock.  
 The resurgence of such rhetoric took place in the new academic context of the development 
since the 1970s of science studies which partially displaced history of science in the allocation of 
resources, although there were close connections which remain. To a large extent developing the 
ideas proposed by the American physicist, turned historian and philosopher, Thomas Kuhn in his 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), science studies became associated, much to 
Kuhn’s dismay, with ideas such as relativism, social constructivism and postmodernism stemming 
from the work of (mostly) French philosophers. Mediated through the work of scholars such as 
Bruno Latour, Stephen Woolgar, Harry Collins, Michel Foucault, Michael Lynch, Barry Barnes and 
Brian Wynne, such ideas challenged scientists’ own perceptions (usually positivist) of their work, its 
epistemological status, as well as their place and function in society. Heated discussions developed 
(which became known as the “Science Wars”) about who had the legitimacy to talk about science to 
the public, which seems to suggest a basic insecurity by scientists about their position. Despite 
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Wolpert announcing at the 1994 Loughborough meeting of the British Association that scientists had 
no interest in such matters, nevertheless he and other scientists spent considerable time and effort 
contradicting their science studies opponents (Lock).  
Such turf wars reinforced popular ideas about the history of science. As Rudwick comments 
when he changed from being a geologist to an historian, some of his former colleagues told him that 
history of science was ‘fit only for those who were senile or at least past being able to do 
intellectually serious research’ that is retired scientists. In the media to this day there is a strong 
tendency to believe that only scientists (retired or otherwise) can comment publicly in non-specialist 
fora on the history of science or review books on the topic – one somehow doubts that the media 
would just go to politicians for the history of politics. Part of the problem here is that historians of 
science have not been able, despite their best efforts, to expunge the standard (whiggish) tropes 
about science or the history of science either from media discourse or from the general public. So, 
for example, there are constant popular references to entities called the scientific revolution or the 
industrial revolution or the two cultures or Renaissance man, a concept which Field argues is 
unhelpful to understanding the period. Related to such popular tropes are terms that many 
scientists love to use to describe their work such as breakthrough, cutting edge, blue sky, ground 
breaking, seminal etc, all of which both historians and sociologists of science have evinced in many 
many studies are meaningless at best. Until such terms and concepts disappear from the lexicon, it 
will be very difficult to sustain a properly informed discussion about science and its place in society 
and culture. If such linguistic change were achieved, however, we will then be well on the way to 
ensuring that everyone sees science as an integral part of culture with no need for top down 
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